Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have proved true through relative usefulness A stage was reached when they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness as a whole,—when belief in them was commanded,—that is to say, when they acted as if they commanded From that time forward they passed as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality answering the ends of a race and a species,—their usefulness alone is their "truth.
The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,—to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.
The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things,—the same process, which every sensual impression [Pg 30] undergoes, is the development of reason! No pre-existing "idea" had anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly as equal Finality in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;—for Life would then become too obscure, too unequal.
The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth. The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we are almost this instinct But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth!
The inability to contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth. We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience—which is not in the least "necessary," but only a sign of inability. If, according to Aristotle, the principium contradictionis is the most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more severely, in order to discover how many assumptions already lie at its root.
It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as if these had become known in some other sphere—that is to say, as if it were impossible to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or the proposition means: that the opposites should not be ascribed to it.
In that case, logic would be an imperative, not directed at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world which must seem true to us.
In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can, create realities, or the concept "reality"? In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as every logical and mathematical proposition presupposes, and that A is in itself an appearance, then logic would have a mere world of appearance as its first condition.
As a matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endless [Pg 32] empiricism which seems to confirm it every minute. The "thing"—that is the real substratum of A; our belief in things is the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion of real being, we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,—in so far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very right to postulate truth or untruth at all,—are already dominated by a belief, that there is such a thing as knowledge for us, and that judgments can really hit the truth: in short, logic never doubts that it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself —that is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite attributes can be ascribed.
In this belief there reigns the sensual and coarse prejudice that our sensations teach us truths concerning things,—that I cannot at the same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is hard and soft. The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations at once," is quite coarse and false. That all contradiction in concepts should be [Pg 33] forbidden, is the result of a belief, that we are able to form concepts, that a concept not only characterises but also holds the essence of a thing As a matter of fact, logic like geometry and arithmetic only holds good of assumed existences which we have created.
Logic is the attempt on our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own purposes That is why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics.
The ego regarded as Being not affected by either Becoming or evolution. The assumed world of subject, substance, reason, etc. In this way we start out with a belief in the "true nature" of things we regard phenomena as real. The character of the world in the process of Becoming is not susceptible of formulation; it is "false" and "contradicts itself. Consequently, knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create the illusion of Being.
If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether an illusion of perspective were not active here—the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line.
Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which is richer and more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon. Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, knowledge is only possible when based on a belief in Being. If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,—if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the "ego" is shown to be something that is evolving: then—— [Pg 35].
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc. We should know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike.
Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know" an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host of mere appearances, but become fixed to the extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is "knowledge" possible—that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
Concerning logical appearance. The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form is attained," it does not signify that it is the same form,—because something new always appears ; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose —the same fault is made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit—an artificial distinction is here made between that which acts and that which guides action but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not "facts". We should not interpret this constraint in ourselves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws " a world of identical cases " as if we were in a position to construct a real world ; but as [Pg 37] a constraint to adjust a world by means of which our existence will be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable, simplified, comprehensible, etc.
The very same constraint is active in the functions of the senses which support the reason—by means of simplification, coarsening, accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of reality. Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing save introduce its postulates into the nature of things: now we find ourselves in their presence,—we can no longer help it,—and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee of "truth.
The world seems logical to us, because we have already made it logical. Fundamental solution. Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to think only in the form of language—we also believe in the "eternal truth" of "wisdom" for instance, subject, attribute, etc. We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language ; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject. There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "substance" is utterly useless as a means of explanation. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism—.
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose. For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a complexity which is thousandfold reaches our consciousness as a simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change—the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness.
That this sequence has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief: consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us. The part "consciousness" plays, —It is essential that one should not mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is our relation to the outer world; it was the outer world that developed it. On the other hand, the direction —that is to say, the care and cautiousness which is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does not enter into our consciousness any more than does the storing activity of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling force at work in these things cannot be doubted—a sort of directing committee, in which the various leading desires make their votes and their power felt.
In short: That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge—the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does [Pg 40] not signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it is so apparently, however, in the highest degree.
We have based the whole of our notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the interests of intercourse It is not the conducting force, but an organ of the latter.
My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, "God is spirit, " God as perfection is " denied Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of things, spirit has always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking.
Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should [Pg 41] the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining finality by the spirit: there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded.
In the collective process of adaptation and systematising, consciousness plays no part at all. Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases in value in proportion as it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the first order.
Meanwhile—according to what standard is this value determined? Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted and often uncertain judgments of caution: the latter is led by the deeper instinct.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower kind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our consciousness and which is therefore obscure, may on [Pg 42] that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness. Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon the passions and senses— as a state of animalism Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man departs from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit, will, goodness—all one.
Every step made towards something better can be only a step forward in consciousness. Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook, ruled, guided, and directed him. Is knowledge a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing as knowledge? Very fine! But if I do not already "know" whether there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably ask the question, "What is knowledge?
And not knowledge! The validity of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as is also the validity of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here moral ontology is the ruling bias. The conclusion, therefore, is: 1 there are propositions which we believe to be universally true and necessary. Kant concludes 1 that there are some propositions which hold good only on one condition; 2 this condition is that they do not spring from experience, but from pure reason.
Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for believing in the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get its cause? But the origin of a belief, of a strong conviction, is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience frequently brings about such a belief!
It already presupposes that there are not only "data a posteriori " but also "data a priori "— that is to say, "previous to experience. An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only in connection with, and when related to, many other judgments, is a guarantee of its truth forthcoming. What is the difference between true and false belief? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal truth cannot be given [Pg 45] by experience! It is therefore independent of experience, of all experience!
The view which comes quite a priori, and therefore independent of all experience, merely out of reason, is "pure knowledge"! In order to establish the a priori character the pure rationality of mathematical axioms, space must be conceived as a form of pure reason. Hume had declared that there were no a priori synthetic judgments. Kant says there are—the mathematical ones!
And if there are such judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge of things by means of pure reason! Mathematics is possible under conditions which are not allowed to metaphysics.
All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics. A judgment is synthetic—that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas. It is a priori —that is to say, this co-ordination is universally true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but by pure reason.
If there are such things as a priori judgments, then reason must be able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must possess a formative faculty. Judging is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be true or false, of asserting or [Pg 46] denying, our certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"— what is believed to be true in all judgments?
What are attributes? But even in this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves are not the cause, we still argue that they must be effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change must have its author";—but this belief in itself is already mythology; for it separates the working cause from the cause in work.
When I say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is stable, which is, and does not "come.
The Judgment —that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every judgment, therefore, there lies [Pg 47] the admission that an "identical" case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does not create the idea that an identical case seems to be there.
It believes rather that it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much older function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike?
What is that second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. Before a judgment can be formed, the process of assimilation must already have been completed : thus, even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions—that is to say, they consist of assimilation, rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly established than the belief in spirit. Perhaps it is a form of faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then strength would certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality. Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion of truth " omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte percipitur.
But this is gross confusion: like simplex sigillum veri. Whence comes the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in this relation to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of power and security, is preferred, valued, and marked as true —The intellect sets its freest and strongest faculty and ability as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is true Thus it is the highest degrees of activity which awaken belief in regard to the object , in regard to its "reality.
According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted.
This question may exasperate the logicians who limit things according to the limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war with this logician's optimism. Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true. What is truth? First proposition. The easier way of thinking always triumphs over the more difficult way;— dogmatically : simplex sigillum veri. Second proposition.
The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those constant entities, is a hundred times more easy than the teaching of Becoming and of evolution. Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of facilitating thought: a means of expression , —not truth. Later on it got to act like truth. Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";—we are at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed, is certainly fictional.
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes—therefore there must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth. If the character of existence were false,:—and this would be possible,—what would truth then be, all our truth? An unprincipled falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an anti-natural tendency : its only purpose would be to provide a means of attaining to a higher degree of falsity.
For a world of truth and Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful". Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting, remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes, dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as " God " in His own image. In order that truthfulness may be possible, the [Pg 52] whole sphere in which man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage in every respect must be with the truthful one.
In the inorganic world it seems to be entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly —ruse begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The problem of the actor. My Dionysian ideal The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest vital instincts: the power which will have error in all life; error as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; the picturing of identical cases, of the seemingness of identity, is more primeval than the cognition of identity.
I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time as things in themselves do not exist. The feeling that post hoc is propter hoc, is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"!
The interpretation of a phenomenon, either as an action or as the endurance of an action that is to say, every action involves the suffering of it , amounts to this: every change, every differentiation, presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, who is "altered.
Psychological history of the concept subject. The body, the thing, the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at length left the "subject" over.
Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a cause ; as, for instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little word "I. The false fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a quality. In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause and effect in the form of an assumption that every effect is the result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent , and even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that faith remains as the most fundamental belief!
I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally this was, I look for an intention behind it, and, above all, I look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: [Pg 55] every phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind all phenomena, this is our oldest habit.
Has the animal also this habit? As a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things through itself. The question why? We have no sign of the "sense of the efficient cause"; in this respect Hume is quite right, habit but not only that of the individual allows us to expect that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, but nothing more!
That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm faith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of processes, but our inability to interpret a phenomenon otherwise than as the result of design. It is the belief in living and thinking things, as the only agents of causation ; it is the belief in will, in design—the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that all actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the "subject. Question: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon?
Or is that also illusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself? A criticism of the concept "cause. But [Pg 56] that is an error.
We distinguish ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of this scheme—we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What have we done? We have misunderstood a feeling of power, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to do this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it.
There is no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to be given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in order to understand a phenomenon, it has been shown to be an illusion. Our understanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in which it happened. In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and our design to do an action: causa efficiens and causa finalis are fundamentally one.
We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us On the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing how it will "act.
Even the "atom" is one of these fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject. At last we understand that things—consequently also atoms—effect nothing: because they are non-existent; and that the concept causality is quite!
Out of a necessary sequence of states, the latter's causal relationship does not follow that would be equivalent to extending their active principle from 1 to 2, to 3, to 4, to 5. There is no such thing as a cause or an effect. From the standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter. If I imagine muscle separated from its "effects," I have denied it In short: a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting.
Causa is a faculty to effect something, superadded fancifully to what happens The interpretation of causality is an illusion A "thing" is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula, which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be put on this side or on that.
It is asserted that in two complex states centres of force the quantities of energy remain constant. The calculability of a phenomenon does not lie in the fact that a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the recurrence of "identical cases.
There is no such thing as a sense of causality, as Kant would have us believe. We are aghast, [Pg 58] we feel insecure, we will have something familiar, which can be relied upon As soon as we are shown the existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified.
The so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar , and the attempt at finding something in it which is already known. To combat determinism and teleology. If a quantity of force determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular case, it does not prove that it has "no free will. We interpreted the possibility of formularising phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law over all existence.
But it does not follow, because I do a determined thing, that I am bound to do it. Compulsion cannot be demonstrated in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we fancied the existence of subjects " agents " in things, the notion arose that all phenomena are the consequence of a compulsory force exercised over the subject—exercised by whom?
Statement A new translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. Edited, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann, with facsims. Contributions Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, tr. Classifications LC Classifications B N5 The Physical Object Pagination xxxii, p. National transportation study socialist novel in Britain Vicks wholesale bulb catalog Estimate of deficiency appropriation for purchase and distribution of seeds, Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a copy of a communication from the Secretary of Agriculture submitting an estimate of deficiency appropriation for purchase of valuable seeds.
Verses and essays. The Presidents Speeches Prospectus and time-table of the session Time for tea Serpent and columbine. A new translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. This volume is the first of its kind, presenting the relationship between these two thinkers on elements of contemporary culture that they shared interests in, including the nature of life in the modern world, philosophy as a way of life, and the ways in which we ought to read and write about other philosophers.
The contributing authors are leading figures in Foucault and Nietzsche studies, and their contributions reflect the diversity of approaches possible in coming to terms with the Foucault-Nietzsche relationship. Specific points of comparison include Foucault and Nietzsche's differing understandings of the Death of God; art and aesthetics; power; writing and authorship; politics and society; the history of ideas; genealogy and archaeology; and the evolution of knowledge.
At the center of this Heraclitean-Protagorean position is a relational ontology in which everything exists and is what it is only in relation to something else. But there is an increasing awareness of his sophisticated engagements with his contemporaries and of his philosophy's rich potential for debates with modern and contemporary thinkers.
Nietzsche's Engagements with Kant and the Kantian Legacy explores a significant field for such engagements, Kant and Kantianism. Bringing together an international team of established Nietzsche-scholars who have done extensive work in Kant, contributors include both senior scholars and young, upcoming researchers from a broad range of countries and traditions.
Working from the basis that Nietzsche is better understood as thinking 'with and against' Kant and the Kantian legacy, they examine Nietzsche's explicit and implicit treatments of Kant, Kantians, and Kantian concepts, as well as the philosophical issues that they raise for both Nietzschean and Kantian philosophy.
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